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Do Smarter People Have Better Passwords? Yes, But.
JV ROIG, Advanced Research Center – Asia Pacific College
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) released new guidelines in June of 2017 that recommended new standards
for managing and accepting user passwords. Among the new guidelines is a requirement that verifiers should check if a user’s supplied
password is compromised – that  is,  already listed in previous breach corpuses.  Using a corpus of 320M breached passwords,  the
researcher collected information regarding Asia Pacific College students using breached passwords. Correlating these with academic
performance data from each student’s grade history, the researcher found that the students in the highest GPA tier had the lowest % of
terrible passwords. The difference is not that large, however, which suggests that weak passwords aren’t mainly because of any level of
intelligence, nor should it be assumed that highly-intelligent users will have good passwords.
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1  INTRODUCTION
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) released new guidelines in June of 2017 that recommended
new standards for managing and accepting user passwords [6]. Among the new guidelines is a requirement that verifiers
should check if a user’s supplied password is compromised – that is, already listed in previous breach corpuses [7]. These
breach corpuses are huge lists of passwords that have been retrieved (mostly unethically and illegally) by black hats who
exploited security holes in public-facing servers. The main problem here, of course, is getting a list of breached passwords.
Fortunately, Troy Hunt, an Australian security researcher, collected lists of breached data that have been published
publicly,  and  then  created  an  online  service,  “Have  I  Been  Pwned?”,  where  users  can  check if  their  usernames  or
passwords (or both) have been included in any past breach. After the NIST guidelines were published, he also publicly
offered, for free download, a list of 320M passwords retrieved from past breaches he has recorded [9]. His motivation was
to explicitly allow researchers and IT departments to implement the new NIST guideline of checking user passwords
against these breached passwords, to be able to warn users if their password is unsafe (i.e., if it is found to match any
password in the breached corpus).
Asia Pacific College (APC), where the researcher is currently employed, embarked on the implementation of this new
guideline using the list from Troy Hunt, and along the way collected data about how many faculty, staff and students used
passwords that were found in the list of 320M breached passwords from Troy Hunt.
The researcher, looking at the data collected from simply flagging whether a user had a breached password or not, had
an idea: maybe we can use this data set to see if intelligence/smartness affects the use of terrible passwords? If we use the
data  solely  of  college  students  (disregarding  staff and  faculty),  then we  would  already have  a  reasonable  metric  to
categorize the intelligence level of each user: GPA (grade point average). This makes simple what would otherwise be the
almost impractically complex problem of categorizing every user’s intelligence level.
2  BACKGROUND
Passwords remain the most  ubiquitous  form of  user  authentication.  Users  are  generally known to be  terrible  at
managing passwords – terrible at creating them (prone to weak, insecure passwords) and terrible at remembering them.
Convenience and human memory limitations make creation of strong passwords an unnatural tendenc, and left on their
own with little guidance, users will inevitably revert to insecure password habits [1, 3]. Users aren’t appreciative of overly
complex and strict  password policies [8],  and these  complex rules  often have the side effect of  encouraging coping
behaviors from users that are not ideal, such as writing passwords down [4]. The seeming lack of care can be attributed to
factors such as believing that the risks associated with their poor password hygiene are overblown or that they aren’t
personally  at  risk  [5].  A  Microsoft  Research  paper  also  found  that  users  often  reuse  passwords  (another  negative
password habit), with passwords reused for an average of 5.67 sites [2]. This same research shared that users were found
to type passwords at an average of 8 instances per day. 
These are all well-known difficulties between users and the password authentication mechanism that they should be
more careful of. New guidelines, such as the previously mentioned NIST Digital Identity Guidelines of June 2017, have
taken into account behavioral factors into refining password policies.
How about intelligence? Does intelligence level affect password hygiene, and perhaps be a factor that should be taken
into account by password policies? 
3  EXPERIMENT DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
3.1 Collecting Data Regarding Relative Password Quality Per Intelligence Level
This experiment benefits from an existing research infrastructure within APC that is continually collecting data. This
existing research infrastructure,  which we shall  call  “PWR” (Password Research) for  ease of  reference,  provided the
researcher with a list of users within APC, plus a marker for each user, labeled “Compromised”, which contains a value
that is either “TRUE” or “FALSE”: “TRUE” means the user’s password was found to exist in Troy Hunt’s list of 320M
passwords that are unsafe and therefore to be considered as compromised (passwords retrieved from past exploits and are
known by malicious actors), “FALSE” means the password was not found. The design of PWR is detailed in the next
section.
With a list of usernames and the compromised password marker, the researcher filtered out all users that were not
college students – usernames of Employees and Senior High students were removed. With assistance from APC’s IT team,
the researcher created an automated script that hooked into APC’s school informaiton system to create a text file that
matches each username with their corresponding GPA. To maintain anonymity and privacy, the usernames in this list are
not the actual usernames of the students; rather, they are hashes of the actual username, so that the researcher and the IT
team does not actually know the identities of the students. The automated script used a lookup table (provided by the
PWR infrastructure) in order to be able to match the GPA to the hashed usernames.
At the end of the process above, the researcher then has a list that contains the hashed usernames (anonymized users,
but all known to be college students), the compromised password marker of TRUE/FALSE, and the GPA. From here, the
researcher processed the text file in buckets of GPA ranges to see how the smarter students compared to their lower GPA
brethren in terms of usage of very unsafe passwords.
3.2 The PWR Infrastructure Design
The PWR infrastructure is composed of three main components. Together, these components provide APC researchers
with  insight  into  the  password  hygiene  of  APC  users,  with  the  data  derived  here  used  to  assess  and  refine  the
organization’s password policies and password education effort.
The first component of PWR  is Troy Hunt’s list of 320M hashed passwords. The list is entirely in SHA1 hashes, no
plaintext  passwords  to  avoid  being  weaponized  [https://www.troyhunt.com/introducing-306-million-freely-
downloadable-pwned-passwords/]. As of the time the PWR infrastructure was created, Troy Hunt’s release consisted of 3
separate files – the original release plus two updates. Combined, the list of hashed passwords is well over 10GB in size.
Searching through for a hash in such a large file is slow. In order to speed up searches for a hash, the author split the hash
list into 256 different files, with each hash going to a specific file based on the first two characters. Hashes that start with
“aa”, for example, were sent to the “aa.txt” file. Since the hashes are rendered as a string of hexadecimal characters, the
files start from “00.txt”, with the last file being “ff.txt”. Searching for a particular hash means determining first what file to
search in based on the first two characters of the hash, and then running the Linux utility grep on that file to search for
the specific hash. This delivers a speedup of two orders of magnitude, which will be needed for the PWR use case as
described further below.
The second component is a set of scripts that hook into APC’s existing school information system (APCIS), which is
PHP-based. The scripts are also in PHP to make them immediately compatible and easy to integrate. These PWR scripts
add  hooks  to  the  login  page  of  APCIS,  so  that  users  who  log  in  will  have  their  passwords  checked  if  they  are
compromised or not based on the first component described above. The passwords are first hashed using SHA1 (to make
them compatible with the Troy Hunt password list), and then that hash is checked against the list of hashes provided by
component one. If the hash is found in the list, that means the user’s password is part of the breach corpus, and it is
marked as compromised. The second component also provides a small library of tools that anonymize the information. Of
note  is  a  special  hash  function  that  is  used  so  that  usernames  are  transformed into  a  hash,  so  that  users  become
unidentifiable. 
The third  component  of  PWR is  an SQLite3 database that stores  the information that  the PWR component two
produces. To maintain anonymity of the data stored, PWR does not log the actual username. As described above, PWR
transforms the username into a hash, and this hashed username is what is stored into the PWR database. Other relevant
information, such as user type (“Employee”,  “College Student”,  “Senior High Student”),  age bracket,  gender,  course /
department,  and  password length are  also stored  along with  the hashed username and the  compromised  password
marker.
Overall, PWR was designed to be compliant with NIST’s latest guideline of checking a user’s password against breach
corpuses.  The  data  collected  by  PWR  is  used  by  APC’s  research  team  for  refinement  of  password  policies  and
strengthening the community’s password hygiene.
4  ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
The PWR data consisted of 1,252 APC users, all of which are college students (non-college students were already
filtered out by the author). This represents 91.52% of all active college students. PWR data also show that 215 of these
users (17.17% of the total) were marked as “compromised”, meaning these 215 use passwords that are in the PWR breach
corpus. 
For reference, APC’s grading system uses 4.0 as the highest, with 1.0 as the minimum passing grade.
Table 1: Statistics of users with unsafe passwords categorized per minimum GPA.
Min GPA # of Students Compromised 
Passwords
% of Compromised 
Passwords
Remarks
3.5 39 5 12.82%  ~13% of students with a GPA of 3.5 and above use 
unsafe passwords
3.0 242 37 15.29% 3.0 and up (including all the 3.5 students from above) 
make the % jump closer to the population average.
2.5 688 103 14.97% The % here goes slightly down. This means the 2.5-3.0 
GPA students contribute a lower % compromised 
compared to the 3.0-3.5 GPA students.
2.0 1152 195 16.93% 17% of students with a GPA of 2.0 to 4.0 use unsafe 
passwords. Not surprising that we are approaching 
the population average now that we’re counting 
majority of the population already
1.5 1251 214 17.11%
1.0 1252 215 17.17% The single student who had a lower than 1.5 GPA also 
happened to use an unsafe password
Table 1 shows an analysis of the distribution of compromised passwords according to minimum GPA. This is not per
bucket / per tier. The last row, for example, contains the entire population (1,252) since it is the lowest grade – therefore,
everybody qualifies in this criteria. What this shows how slicing the population into a certain GPA range compares to the
population average of 17.17% compromised passwords. This shows us, for example, that if we only take into account
students with a GPA of at least 3.5, only 12.82% of them use compromised passwords, which compares favorably to the
population average of 17.17%. Looking at students with a minimum GPA of 3.0 results in 15.29% compromised passwords,
which is significantly closer to the population average.
 Table 2: A per GPA-tier view of percentage of compromised passwords.
GPA Tier # of Students Compromised 
Passwords
% of Compromised 
Passwords
Remarks
3.5 - 4.0 39 5 12.82% Students with a GPA between 3.5 and 4.0 had the 
lowest % of unsafe passwords
3.0 – 3.49 203 32 15.76% Honor students – between 3.0 to 3-5 – fared slightly 
worse than the tier below
2.5 – 2.99 446 66 14.80%
2.0 – 2.49 464 92 19.83% These students had the worst number of unsafe 
passwords in terms of percentage
1.5 – 1.99 99 19 19.19% Second-worst tier in terms of percentage
1.0 – 1.49 1 1 100.00% The single student who had a lower than 1.5 GPA also 
happened to use an unsafe password
Table 2 shows the same data in a slightly different view – instead of aggregating students together gradually through
minimum GPA, this time they are separated into 6 GPA tiers (from 1.0 to 4.0 in 0.5 increments). As Table 1 seemed to
indicate, Table 2 makes it clear that the 2.5-2.99 GPA tier has a slightly better percentage compared to the higher tier of
3.0-3.49.
Whether viewed as grouped per minimum GPA as in Table 1, or as GPA tiers in Table 2, it is obvious that the more
intelligent students (at least, if we take for granted for now that a higher GPA means more intelligent) do outperform
their lower-GPA brethren. Even discounting the lowest tier since it only has a sample size of 1, the final two tiers do have
significantly  higher  percentages  of  compromised  password  use  compared  to  the  higher  tiers,  and  outperform  the
population average of 17.17%
The PWR dataset used here also indicates that the mean APC password length is  11.2 characters with a mode of 10
characters. Over 98% of users have 8 characters or more, over 50% have 10 or more characters, and over 25% use at least
12 characters.  This means the usage of short passwords is an almost non-existent problem for APC users.  With the
prevalence of long passwords (8+ characters, as per NIST recommendation), a password that is not found in the PWR
hash lists has a good chance of being a strong password. 
5  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This analysis seems to show that smarter people do seem to have better password hygiene. While quantitative results
such as these are always helpful as insights for refining password policies, it is important to note several caveats in this
study:
1.) This assumes that higher GPA means smarter. While this may generally be the case, this is far from a foregone
conclusion. Smartness or intelligence is a complex subject, and the measurement of intelligence is not something
that is trivial and universally accepted. A different study that has access to other measures of intelligence – such
as standardized aptitude tests – to combine with GPA may yield further insightful results
2.)  This only classifies password as good or bad based on whether it is in the list of known bad passwords.  Being
found in the hash list of the PWR infrastructure definitely means the password is unsafe. However, the reverse is
not automatically true – just because the password is not list of known bad passwords doesn’t mean it is a
perfectly safe one. While this is likely to be true here due to the prevalence of long passwords among APC users,
this isn’t a guarantee. A different study that has access to more password parameters for classifying the strength
of passwords may yield further insightful results. (The author would note here that within the current PWR
infrastructure, it is impossible to make a password strength analysis based on the character composition of the
password. The PWR infrastructure does not handle or store plaintext passwords)
3.)  The sample population here is limited and may be biased. The experiment is limited to APC college students.
There may be a certain bias inherent in the population, so repeating the experiment in a different schools may
yield further insightful results.
Do smarter people have better passwords?  It seems so, at least among college students, and assuming GPA is a good
measure of intelligence, and that the APC college population is a good representation of users in general. This shouldn’t
be taken as the end-all or be-all of whether smarter people have better passwords, but merely one interesting data point
in what could be an interesting series of further experiments.
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